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NOTES
RELEASE OF GRAND JURY MINUTES IN THE NA-
TIONAL DEPOSITION PROGRAM OF THE ELECTRICAL
EQUIPMENT CASES
I. THE SCOPE OF THE LITIGATION
Beginning in September 1959, five federal grand juries in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania investigated the activities of the electrical equip-
ment manufacturers.' This investigation resulted in twenty criminal
indictments under the Sherman Act 2 against a total of twenty-nine manu-
facturers and forty-four individuals. 3 Each indictment was based upon a
specific type of equipment, called a "product line," made by three or more
of the companies involved. Following the indictments and subsequent
convictions, approximately 1,900 private antitrust treble damage actions 4
were filed in thirty-four judicial districts.5
This litigation created serious problems of judicial administration.
First, this is "multiple litigation," which consists of cases in more than one
judicial district involving common questions of fact requiring the testimony
of the same witnesses. Moreover, these cases will strain the resources of
both the courts and the parties. For example, more than 400 such actions
were filed -in the Southern District of New York alone during the 1962
1 See generally Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy I, Fortune, April
1961, p. 132; Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy II, Fortune, May 1961,
p. 161.
226 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
3 See Application of California To Inspect Grand Jury Subpoenas, 195 F. Supp.
37, 39 (E.D. Pa. 1961). These indictments led to conviction of the twenty-nine
manufacturers, fines of nearly two million dollars, and jail sentences for thirty of
the manufacturers' employees, twenty-three of which were suspended. See Smith,
The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy II, Fortune, May 1961, p. 161, at 222. If nothing
else had happened, these cases would be remarkable because seven corporate executives
were imprisoned for thirty days for antitrust violations.
4 These actions are based on § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
In most instances the complaints in the private actions followed the generic
product line distinction of the indictments. Each plaintiff filed a complaint for each
product line in which he had made purchases, naming the companies making that
product as defendants. Thus, some large utilities have sued some defendants as many
as eighteen times. In a few cases, predominantly in the Western District of Wash-
ington, the plaintiffs have sued on all of the product lines in a single complaint, often
numbering over 200 pages and usually printed in book form for filing and service.
5 As of June 30, 1963, 1,882 such actions had been filed, of which 35 had been
terminated. See 1963 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFIcE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 139-40. In 1962 these actions accounted for 85% of all
antitrust actions filed. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) 1f 50161 (Oct. 9, 1962).
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fiscal year,6 compared with an average of 272 private treble damage cases
per year filed in all districts during the preceeding four years.7 One of the
large defendants, General Electric, manufactures items involved in eighteen
out of the nineteen product lines and has been sued in more than 1,700
of these cases. In addition to the cost of employing counsel in each of the
thirty-four districts -to defend these suits, General Electric has been faced
with a growing burden of settlement costs, which will exceed $160,000,000
in "price adjustments." 8
The electrical equipment cases constitute the greatest body of multiple
litigation in the history of the federal courts.9 This note will consider the
processes used for controlling the deposition phase of discovery in these
cases, with particular emphasis on the relationships between the depositions,
grand jury minutes, and the intricacies of appeal from certain orders.
II. CONTROL OF DIscovERY-THE NATIONAL DEPOSITION PROGRAMI
A. The Formulation of the National Deposition Program--
An Ad Hoc Procedure
In order to cope with this unprecedented situation, Chief Justice
Warren appointed the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation, 0
known as the Murrah Committee, whose primary function has been the
coordination of discovery procedures and the regulation of pretrial matters
in the electrical equipment cases."
One of the initial means explored by the Committee to avoid repeated
depositions of witnesses was the creation of a national deposition program
6See 1963 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS ANN. REP. 140. More than one hundred cases were filed in each of four
other districts: the Northern District of Illinois (225); the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (164); the Southern District of California (128); and the Western
District of Washington (127). Including suits filed during 1963, 1,104 out of the
1,882 cases were filed in these five districts. Ibid.
7 Id. at 139.
s See BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 147, p. A-11 (May 5, 1964).
GE recently settled suits brought by a group of forty-four utilities for $26,500,000.
N.Y. Times, May 1, 1964, p. 58, col. 3 (City ed.). Compare Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1963 Trade Cas. 11 70966, at 78831 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11,
1963) (settlement by Westinghouse with two plaintiffs for $5,000,000). These settle-
ments have been referred to as "price adjustments" because the amount of the
settlement is based on a percentage of the purchase price paid.
Similarly, six firms have recently been confronted with a jury verdict of $9,657,405
trebled to $28,972,217. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 5
CCH TRADE REm. REP. (Trade Cas.) 11 71123 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 1964).
9 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 729
(N.D. Ill. 1962).
10 This committee is a subcommittee of the Committee on Pretrial Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. It was appointed on
Feb. 7, 1962, and was headed by the Hon. Alfred P. Murrah, Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See 5 TRADE REa. REP. (Trade Cas.) 1[ 50128
(Feb. 7, 1962).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1958) ; Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation,
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 21 (March 7, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as 1963 REPORT].
For previous consideration of the many techniques suggested by the Murrah
Committee, particularly the tight judicial control of discovery, see Handbook of
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in which the witness would be deposed once by "lead counsel" 12 and this
deposition would be subsequently filed in each district.' 3 These depositions
were to be taken before a district judge with the power to make binding
rulings concerning the scope of examination, questions of privilege, work
product, and similar matters without recourse to the judge to whom the
case was assigned for trial.14 The Murrah Committee then asked counsel
for both sides in three "lead districts" to submit proposals for a national
deposition program 15 and subsequently met with a small group of these
attorneys to discuss them.' 6 Plaintiffs' counsel present at this meeting
were subsequently designated as a "steering committee" and were asked
to prepare a draft of a national pretrial order [hereinafter referred to as
NPTO] establishing the national deposition program."' Thereafter, oppos-
ing counsel met to seek areas of agreement on the order, and then submitted
an order upon which they agreed, designated as NPTO 8, to the court in
Chicago.'8  Since a suggested national order was binding only when
Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Handbook]. See also Proceedings of the Seminar on Pro-
tracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319 (1958) (the Stanford Seminar) ; Procedure in Antitrust
and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1951) (Prettyman Report).
12"Lead counsel" consist of attorneys representing certain of the larger parties
on both sides and have acted on behalf of all parties on their side on many occasions,
thus reducing the financial burden on the smaller parties. The large parties favor
this procedure since they can save money by not having to be present while each small
party would argue individually.
-3 See Murrah Committee, 1 REPORT TO THE JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrE
STATES 2-3 (May 1962). When this proposal was formally adopted by the committee
on April 27, 1962, in Norfolk, Virginia, it was contemplated that the depositions would
be taken on a product line basis. The purposes of the unified national deposition
program were stated to be: to avoid repeated depositions of witnesses; to maximize
the potential utility of the deposition in all phases of the litigation, eliminating, as
much as was possible, the need for supplemental discovery; and to provide testimony
utilizable under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d). See Neal, Memorandum on Certain Aspects
of the Program for Taking Common Depositions 1, July 1962 (on file in the Judges'
Information Center, United States Courthouse, Chicago, Ill.) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum]. The Committee also established the Judges' Information Center in
Chicago to serve as a clearing house for papers in these cases.
34 Memorandum 1-2.
15 Transcript of Proceedings, pp. 8-9, San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 17, 1962 [herein-
after cited as San Francisco tr.]. The lead districts chosen were Chicago (N.D.
Ill.), New York (S.D.N.Y.), and Seattle (W.D. Wash.). Ibid. At the same time,
the Committee was considering proposals to establish other uniform discovery pro-
cedures.
16 See San Francisco tr. 11. Although the five judges present represented all of
the districts in which these cases were pending, this meeting was unique in that only
twenty-two counsel were present, and the discussion was held off the record. Id.
at 2-3, 13.
17 See San Francisco tr. 15-16. This steering committee, which was originally
suggested by Neal, has continued to serve as lead counsel for plaintiffs, although
it was expanded to include counsel from all parts of the country. See Tran-
script of Proceedings, p. 4, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
Civil No. 61C1277 and related cases, N.D. Ill., Sept. 12, 1962 [hereinafter cited as
1 Chicago tr.]. In most jurisdictions in which these cases are pending, orders are
filed only in the first case to which the order is applicable, but the order is docketed
in all cases. Thus, all unreported proceedings in this district will hereinafter be
cited to Commonwealth Edison Co., and the date will be given.
Is See I Chicago tr. 4-5, 22. See also notes 24-27 infra and accompanying text.
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entered by each local district in which -these cases were pending, the
Murrah Committee concurrently asked all judges in such districts to
enter NPTO 1 19 which stayed all depositions and other discovery until a
voluntary national deposition program could be formulated.
20
As finally formulated, NPTO 8 stays plaintiffs from taking further
depositions of present or former employees of defendants except as provided
in the order or subsequent orders of the court.21 Schedule A to the order
provides that the depositions will be taken before a judge,22 that the
deposition may be used in accordance with rule 26(d) 23 by or against any
party present or represented at the deposition or who had notice thereof,
2 4
and that the scope of examination shall be governed by rule 26, except
19 See Murrah Committee, BuLLETIN No. 4, at 2 (Aug. 20, 1962). This pro-
cedure can be justified on the ground that since these depositions were to be presided
over by a judge, see San Francisco tr. 12-13, 15-16, the Judicial Conference, acting
through the Murrah Committee, was preparing "plans for assignment of judges to
or from circuits or districts where necessary . . . ." See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1958).
20 See 1963 REPORT 5; cf. Handbook 383, 388. In addition to NPTO 1 the com-
mittee recommended entry of NPTO 2, NPTO 6 (providing for uniform inter-
rogatories by defendants with regard to transactions with plaintiffs), and NPTO 5
(providing for similar interrogatories by plaintiffs with regard to meetings and pricing
policies of defendants). See 1963 REPORT 5-6. In addition NPTO 3 provides for the
stipulation of certain facts; NPTO 4 provides a schedule for defendants' "rule 12"
motions; and NPTO 7 provides the terms for placing certain cases on a "standby
basis." See id. at 6-7. These seven orders were based on similar orders already
entered in the Southern District of New York.
This control over discovery by the district court is supportable on the following
grounds: (1) the general equity powers of the court; (2) FED. R. Civ. P. 1, which
provides that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action," see Freund, The Pleading and Pretrial of an Antitrust
Claim, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 555, 561 (1961) ; and (3) FED. R. Civ. P. 16, which provides
that the court may order a pretrial conference to consider "such other matters as
may aid in the disposition of the action." Cf. Advisory Committee on Rules for
Civil Procedure, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 24-26 (1955), proposing that rule
16 be amended to provide that the chief judge of a district be empowered to assign
a protracted case to a designated judge for "control of all matters preliminary to
trial, including control of the taking of depositions and of discovery . . . ." The
Committee's comment on this section indicates that it would implement the Prettyman
Report, see note 11 supra, but that the courts already possess the powers detailed in
the amendment. Compare Memorandum 3-4, accepting the reasoning that the courts
possess these powers under rule 16, even though the 1955 amendment was not adopted
by the Supreme Court.
21 NPTO 8, 1 2-3.
22 NPTO 8, Schedule A, 1.
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
24 NPTO 8, Schedule A, 112. Among the implications of this provision is that
the deposition binds virtually all parties in all districts since the order provides that
the depositions will be noticed in each district where the order has been entered.
See id. f 3. Compare Memorandum 3. While the primary purpose of this para-
graph is to make it abundantly clear that rule 26(d) applies, it has been relied on
to term the deposition a "trial deposition." See City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1962), appeal dismissed, No. 14296,
3d Cir., Feb. 21, 1963. Rule 26(d) (3) provides that:
The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
party for any purpose if the court finds: 1, that the witness is dead; or 2, that
the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or
hearing . . . or 4, that the party offering the deposition has been unable
to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or 5, upon application
and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable,
in the interest of justice . . . to allow the deposition to be used.
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that examination relating to specific damages of any individual plaintiff
"shall not be had until further order of [the] . . . Court." 25 Schedule
B, entered in each district approximately two weeks after the principal
order, provides that parties represented by counsel at the deposition shall
conclude their interrogation prior to a forty-day adjournment of the
deposition.2" By allowing absent counsel to read the transcripts and then
move for further examination within thirty days, the adjournment process
eases the impact of the initial order on small plaintiffs and defendants who
might not be financially able to have counsel at all of the depositions.
27
In the absence of such application, further interrogation by deposition is
barred, except on order of the deposition judge for good cause shown
by any party. 8
NPTO 8 was not entered at the Chicago hearing; instead, an order
was entered to show cause why the form agreed upon should not be
accepted.29 This process allows any party to object to the entry of the
order at a subsequent pretrial hearing, and allows time for similar show-
cause orders to be entered in other districts." However, once the order
has been recommended on the national level, it has been impossible to
alter it since local objections have been overruled in virtually all cases.31
The pressure for conformity has prevented a variance in a national order
to allow the resolution of a local motion for the production of documents
which was pending when the national order was recommended.3 2 In like
manner smaller parties, who were not heard in Chicago during the drafting
process and whose interests differed from the large, represented defendants,3
have been relatively unsuccessful in obtaining special provisions applicable
to them.34  Despite this, the national deposition program has proved
successful in avoiding thirty-four repetitious depositions of the same depo-
- NPTO 8, Schedule A, 114. Local discovery was to be provided later with
regard to individual damages.
26 NPTO 8, Schedule B, 1111 -2.
27 Id. at 1112-3. See Transcript of Proceedings, Washington, D.C., pp. 48-50,
Sept. 21, 1962 [hereinafter cited as Washington tr.] (objection of Allen-Bradley Co.,
a small defendant sued in only one of the product lines and in only 50 of the 1,700
suits, that broad discovery could bankrupt or destroy the small defendant). Compare
id. at 65; Transcript of Proceedings, p. 19, Commonwealth Edison Co., Sept. 26, 1962.
2
8 NPTO 8, Schedule B, 1 4.
29 See 1 Chicago tr. 9.
30 See id. at 9, 16.
31 See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings, Commonwealth Edison Co., Sept. 26,
1962. Plaintiffs stated that they had no objection to the entry of NPTO 8, id. at 5-6,
while most of the defendants stated that they neither objected nor consented to the
entry of the order, id. at 15. Several objections, id. at 16-19, were overruled without
opinion and the order was entered, id. at 37.
32 See Washington tr. 24-26.
3 3 The disparateness of the parties can be seen by realizing that the amount of
damages alleged by plaintiffs ranged from several thousand dollars to $70,000,000, or
by comparing defendant Southern States, Inc., having a total net worth of $2,000,000,
see Washington tr. 57, with the position of General Electric discussed in the text
accompanying note 8 supra.
34 See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings, Commonwealth Edison Co., pp. 26-34,
Sept. 26, 1962 (objections of five defendants to the entry of NPTO 9) ; note 31 supra.
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nents and in permitting a single ruling on the scope and relevance of the
testimony sought during any given deposition.35 Moreover, the smaller
parties on both sides can rely on the larger parties' counsel to ask all of the
initial questions, resulting in substantial financial savings.
B. National Pretrial Order 9-A Nationalized Procedure
While NPTO 8 was formulated through negotiations between oppos-
ing counsel, NPTO 9, which requires -the production of numerous docu-
ments in connection with the plaintiffs' first round, 8 was adopted under
a more representative procedure. Counsel for both sides submitted
drafts of the proposed NPTO 9 and met together to seek areas of agree-
ment.3 However, the remaining areas of disagreement were not resolved
through local show-cause orders in the same manner as NPTO 8, but were
settled after argument by counsel from both sides before a national hearing
held by the Murrah Committee and certain other judges.38  After the
judges heard the principal arguments, a recess for deliberation was taken,
8 9
following which the committee announced its resolution of the issues; 40 a
draft of the modified order was prepared and objections were heard and
decided the same day.41 This nationalized "town-meeting" procedure
became the model for formulating many subsequent national pretrial orders,
among them NPTO 10, which scheduled the first round of twelve depo-
sitions. 42 This procedure has the unique benefit of drawing all the parties
and the judges together to resolve the problems of a national order. Only
one judge in one division of a district in which these cases are pending has
refused to enter the orders implementing the national discovery program.43
35 However, this procedure does not avoid the problems of diverse rulings con-
cerning the admissibility of matter contained in the deposition when it is offered at
trial. See text accompanying notes 229-30 infra.
36 The documents required to be produced by NPTO 9 included: all documents
produced by the defendants before the grand juries; the expense accounts, travel
vouchers, and appointment books for seventy-six employees of the defendants; papers
used at or prepared by employees in connection with competitors' meetings, and similar
materials. See NPTO 9, [4(a), (c)-(f).
37 See Transcript of Proceedings, Commonwealth Edison Co., pp. 5-6, Sept. 12,
1962.
U See Washington tr. 10-28 (plaintiffs' argument), 28-67 (defendants' argu-
ment). This meeting was held in Washington, D.C., on Sept 21, 1962, immedi-
ately after the meeting of the judicial conference. The Murrah Committee and
counsel for both sides were present. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 729, 733 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
39 Washington tr. 67.
4 0 Id. at 77-81.
41 See id. at 101.
42 The procedure used to formulate some of the later orders, particularly those
dealing with defendants' interrogatories and depositions, was similar to that used
for NPTO 8, in that arguments were held only in the lead districts of the Northern
District of Illinois and the Southern District of New York. However, many more
parties were represented at these later arguments than at the arguments on NPTO 8,
and the procedure appears to have been far more "national" in scope.
4 3 Judge Halbert (N.D. Cal. N. Div.) refused to enter the orders as contra-
dicting his prior order directing production of certain documents. Instead, he stayed
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However, it intensifies the burden on all of the parties to be present and
to register their objections, for local objections have been of little effect
once the national order is drafted.
C. The Subsequent Rounds
While the first depositions were being taken, counsel met with the
judges to consider the next phase of the national deposition program.44
After the completion of the first round, counsel again met with the Murrah
Committee at a nationwide meeting which resulted in NPTO 11, establish-
ing the second round of depositions. 45
The pattern of a nationalized meeting was repeated again in May
1963 when seventy-two attorneys met with thirty-six judges during the
latter stages of the second round to establish the final steps in the plaintiffs'
program of national depositions 6 This meeting initiated the procedure
of having each judge present sit as if he were presiding as a district judge
at a pretrial hearing in his own district 47-resulting in one simultaneous
pretrial hearing for more than 1,800 cases. In addition the ensuing orders,
among them NPTO 16 scheduling a third round of depositions,48 adopted
a priority theory of discovery for the product lines that would be tried
first.49 Finally, the program has now grown beyond the scope of plaintiffs'
national discovery. NPTO 25 provided for the first round of defendants'
national depositions in the priority product lines.5 °0  However, too many
depositions were scheduled under NPTO 25,51 and NPTO 30 was formu-
lated, revising the schedule for defendants' round one and adding defend-
ants' round two.52 In retrospect a program which began as an experiment
attempting to coordinate discovery proceedings has become an established
all proceedings. See Transcript of Pretrial Hearing, Sacramento Municipal Util.
Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Civil No. 8380 and related cases, N.D. Cal.,
Oct. 8, 1962. However, a motion to reopen the proceedings has been argued, and
the process of reactivating the cases has begun. See Reporter's Transcript, id., Dec.
23, 1963. Judge Zirpoli, sitting in the Southern Division, has entered the orders.
44 This meeting was held at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Nov. 30, 1962.
45 This meeting was held at San Antonio, Texas, on Feb. 25-27, 1963. See 1963
REPORT 3. NPTO 11 incorporates Schedules A and B of NPTO 8 into Schedule B
of NPTO 11. Schedule A of NPTO 11 provides for forty-three additional depositions,
and NPTO 12 governs the production of documents with regard to those depositions.
46 This meeting was held May 25, 1963, in Baltimore, Maryland. See Transcript
of Proceedings, pp. 2-19, Baltimore, Md., May 25, 1963.
4 7 See id. at 20.
48 See NPTO 16. Schedule A to NPTO 16 adds twenty-three depositions.
NPTO 17 governs the production of documents for this round.
49 See NPTO 15, 11 7. The generic products involved are steam turbine generators,
power transformers, and hydrogenerators. See also note 13 supra.
BO See NPTO 25, which schedules twenty-five depositions on behalf of defendants
and which carries over the priority theory of NPTO 15. NPTO 26 governs the
production of documents for this round.
51' See Defendants' Petition for Relief From the Current Pretrial Schedule
Imposed Under the National Discovery Program, Commonwealth Edison Co., Oct.
20, 1963.
5 2 See NPTO 30, which schedules seventy-three additional depositions. NPTO
31 governs the production of documents for these two rounds.
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procedure leading to more than thirty uniformly adopted national pretrial
orders, scheduling 178 depositions and requiring production of thousands
of documents incident to these depositions.
III. GRAND JURY RELEASE AND THE NATIONAL DEPOSITION PROGRAM
A. The Doctrine of Secrecy and Standards for the Release
of Grand Jury Minutes
The proceedings of a grand jury have traditionally been secret,53 and
that secrecy has usually been protected by denying motions for the release
of grand jury testimony.54 However, this policy has been seriously chal-
lenged by plaintiffs' demands for inspection and release of grand jury
minutes in the electrical cases, and the problem of when grand jury secrecy
should be breached has become a central issue in these cases.
55
Five reasons have been advanced for maintaining grand jury secrecy:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be
contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand
jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons . . . from
importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of
perjury or tampering with witnesses who may testify before the
grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons
who have information with respect to the commission of crimes;
(5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from dis-
closure of the fact that he has been under investigation .... 56
The primary rationales for secrecy are institutional; all of the reasons
but the last are designed to protect the grand jury itself 57 and the criminal
process, but not those brought before the grand jury.58 The first reason
53 See Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Ride of Secrecy, 48 VA.
L. REV. 668, 669 (1962); Note, Disclosure of Grand Jury Minutes To Challenge
Indictments and Impeach Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 111 U. PA. L. Rxv.
1154 (1963).
m See, e.g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958).
55 This problem was foreshadowed by three related proceedings in the electrical
cases. See Application of California To Inspect Grand Jury Subpoenas, 195 F. Supp.
37 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (motion of California and certain public and private utilities to
inspect the 440 subpoenas duces tecum and seventy subpoenas ad testificandum issued
on behalf of the grand juries) ; In re Grand jury Proceedings, 29 F.R.D. 151 (E.D'
Pa. 1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962) (motion of Federal Trade Commission
to inspect the grand jury minutes to determine if certain 1937 cease and desist orders
had been violated by the defendants); United States v. General Elec. Co., 209 F.
Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (motion by defendants to impound the grand jury minutes
to prevent the Government and the Tennessee Valley Authority from using them).
56 United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628 (3d Cir. 1954); United States v.
Amazon Industrial Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931).
5 7 See Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1154, 1155 (1963).
58 One court has stated that secrecy was never intended as a safeguard for the
accused or third persons. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 285 (E.D.
Pa. 1933) (Kirkpatrick, J.). While this is correct as to those indicted, the fourth
reason protects a third person who is a witness, and the fifth reason is intended
to protect the accused who is not indicted.
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becomes inapplicable once the defendant is indicted,59 the second when
the grand jury has been discharged, and the third when the trial is
completed. However, the fourth reason, encouraging free disclosure, is
applicable no matter when disclosure is sought, although it may become
less important as time passes. The last reason, protecting the innocent,
does not lose its force with the passage of time. Every release of testimony
may withdraw protection from innocent suspects and witnesses, and, even
when it does not affect the grand jury involved, may retard free disclosure
by witnesses before subsequent grand juries. Thus, courts have treated
secrecy as a general policy, preserved even if there is no immediate need
therefor, unless the movant is able to show a compelling reason for
release.60
The problem of when grand jury secrecy should be breached is
particularly acute in antitrust cases; the need to encourage the candor of
witnesses is unusually great because the witnesses are often employees,
officers, customers, or suppliers of a potential defendant."' The Supreme
Court has stated that if the witness knew that his supposedly secret
narrative would be revealed to the accused, "testimony would be parsi-
monious," particularly "in antitrust proceedings where fear of business
reprisal might haunt both the grand juror and the witness." 62 Even
though the same line of testimony may be revealed at trial, release of
grand jury minutes might be more likely to provoke reprisal because the
witness may have been less guarded in his testimony concerning personal
business relationships. Thus, the standards for breach of secrecy should
be particularly high in an antitrust case to promote full disclosure before
the grand jury.
Despite the strong reasons for the protection of secrecy, the courts
have constructed standards for the release of grand jury testimony in
certain categories of cases. These tests now implement criminal rule
6(e), which provides:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than
its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the
attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer
may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when
so directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with a
59 See Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1154, 1155 (1963).
60 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486, 489 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), appeal dismissed, No. 14296, 3d Cir., Feb. 21, 1963. But see Developments
in the Lawe--Discovery, 74 HAxv. L. REv. 940, 1013 (1961).
61 See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) ; Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959).
62 Ibid. Contra, Developments in the Law--Discovery, 74 HIARv. L. Rwv. 940,
1013-14 (1961) (arguing that this reasoning is "fanciful"). See also 63 COLUm. L.
REv. 1130, 1134 (1963). The Antitrust Civil Process Act, 76 Stat. 548, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1311-12 (1962), may obviate this rationale for secrecy in the antitrust grand jury
context since similar information may be publicly obtained through the civil investiga-
tive demand provided by this legislation. See 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1021 (1963).
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judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request
of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a
motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring
before the grand jury.63
In allowing release "preliminary to or in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding," rule 6(e) controls both civil and criminal cases.64 In essence
the civil party is making a motion addressed to the court's jurisdiction
over the grand jury as an arm of the court which, as a part of the criminal
process, is governed by the rules of criminal procedure.
The first category of cases in which release has been granted consists
of situations where the criminal defendant seeks the grand jury minutes
to challenge the indictment, to obtain evidence favorable to him, or to
impeach a Government witness.65 Although these attempts once met with
great disfavor,6" some courts now allow release to prevent the suppression
of evidence favorable to hirmr 7  In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co.,65 the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying the
defendants' motion to inspect the minutes, although it stated that a
defendant might be allowed to inspect the grand jury minutes when it
furthers the ends of justice.60 A fuller articulation of this test is found in
the recent case of United States v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,7" where
the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim to inspect the minutes
of the Government's key witness as a matter of right, but held that dis-
closure would be "proper where the ends of justice require it," or where
defendants had shown "'a particularized need' . . . which outweighs the
policy of secrecy." 7- The Court also stated that a showing of contra-
diction between trial and grand jury testimony would not be necessary.
72
3 FED. R. CRIm. P. 6(e). This rule has been stated to be merely declarative of
the prior law that disclosure is committed to the discretion of the trial court. See
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959).
64 See, e.g., Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958) (L. Hand, J.);
Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 193 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass.
1958); In the Matter of Special 1952 Grand jury, 22 F.R.D. 102 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
65 The grounds for release in criminal cases are analyzed in Note, 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 1154 (1963).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Violon, 173 Fed. 501 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) ; United
States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). See also cases collected in United
States v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.R.D. 486, 487 n.2a (D. Del. 1954) (civil case);
Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 482, 483 (1960).
S67 See Note, 111 U. PA. L. Rv. 1154, 1190-93 (1963); cf. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (suppression of a statement by a companion exonerating the
defendant violated due process "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution") ; Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34 F.R.D.
87, 89 (1964).
O8 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
09 310 U.S. at 234. See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass v. United States, 360 U.S.
395, 400 (1959).
70 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
71 Id. at 400. This case thus incorporates the civil test of Procter & Gamble.
See notes 85-88 infra and accompanying text.
72 360 U.S. at 400-01 (dictum).
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The second class of cases involves motions by governmental or quasi-
governmental bodies to obtain the minutes for use in subsequent proceed-
ings. In the first case of this type, a petition to vacate an order releasing
the minutes of a grand jury of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for
use by the federal government in a beer-permit revocation proceeding in
New Jersey was denied on the ground that release would further the
ends of justice.7 In another case minutes were released to the
Commissioners of the District of Columbia to aid an investigation of
possible misconduct by a police officer. 74
Similarly, in Doe v. Rosenberry,75 the petitioner moved for the return
of grand jury minutes previously released to a state bar grievance com-
mittee pursuant to the suggestion of a federal grand jury which had failed to
indict the movant on charges of corruption and criminal activity. In
sustaining the denial of the motion, the Second Circuit held that the
hearing before the grievance committee was a judicial proceeding within
rule 6(e), and that the rule was not limited to criminal proceedings:
[T] he term "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding deter-
minable by a court, having for its object the compliance of any
person . . . with standards imposed upon his conduct in the
public interest, even though such compliance is enforced without
the procedure applicable to the punishment of crime. An inter-
pretation that should not go at least so far, would not only be in
the teeth of the language employed, but would defeat any rational
purpose that can be imputed to the Rule.
76
Release has also been granted to local government authorities, pursuant
to the suggestion of the grand jury, to determine whether state criminal
prosecutions should be sought.77  In these situations the grand jury's
recommendation of release does not affect the general policy of secrecy,
but since the particular grand jury has waived secrecy as a protection for
itself, release has been easier to obtain. In addition recommendation of
release to another authority may reduce the return of tenuous federal
indictments.
The third class of cases involves a relatively rare situation in which
the civil defendant seeks to obtain the grand jury minutes of the private
civil plaintiff who has been either a Government witness or a defendant in
a preceeding criminal antitrust action. In either situation the defendant's
motion is based upon the theory that a civil plaintiff should not be allowed
to conceal facts which are unfavorable to his case in his prior testimony.
73 n re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1933).
74 &n re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1952).
75 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958) (L. Hand, J.).
76 Id. at 120. See notes 91-93 infra and accompanying text.
77 1t re Petition for Disclosure of Evidence Before the October 1959 Grand Jury
of This Court, 184 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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In a most unusual case defendants in a private treble damage action were
allowed discovery of plaintiff's grand jury minutes 78 when plaintiff's
deposition answers were vague if not unresponsive, despite the opposition
of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.79 Similarly, release
was apparently allowed in a case where plaintiff put his grand jury
testimony in issue during his deposition when he stated that testimony
favoring the defendant which he had given before the grand jury was
untrue.
8 0
The last situation in which release has been granted arises when the
defendant in a civil action brought by the Government after a grand jury
investigation seeks to obtain favorable evidence in the minutes.8' Although
the defendant may be claiming that the grand jury process was subverted
because the Government never intended to seek a criminal indictment,
82
the principal argument is that the Government should not be allowed to
suppress unfavorable evidence in the minutes while using favorable por-
tions to refresh a witness' memory. This theory has also been employed
by the criminal defendant, but it may not be as persuasive in civil cases
because of the alternative methods of 'discovery. 83 However, one court
responded to -this problem by finding that the imbalance arising from the
Government's use of the minutes was sufficient cause for production of
the minutes of all witnesses who would be called at trial.
8 4
In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,8 5 the Supreme Court
reversed the district court's dismissal of a civil suit entered after the
Government had refused to produce the grand jury minutes for inspection
78 In the Matter of Special 1952 Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 102 (E.D. Pa. 1958)
(plaintiff had been named as a coconspirator in a Bill of Particulars by the grand
jury and subsequently sued the defendant who had been investigated but not indicted
by the same grand jury).
79 Id. at 107. Compare text accompanying note 185 infra.
80 Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 763 (D.
Mass. 1958). Like the preceding case, defendant, United Shoe, had not been indicted
by the grand jury. Moreover, Schwabe's counsel knew the contents of the minutes
since he had been a Government attorney who prosecuted the Government civil action
against United Shoe, and the grand jury had been discharged more than ten years
before the motion for production. Id. at 764.
81 United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J. 1955)
(motion under FED. R. Civ. P. 34 in an action brought by the Government under
the False Claims Act). Compare United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 21 F.R.D.
103 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
82 See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). While
this claim was rejected as unsubstantiated by the Supreme Court, the district court
subsequently found that the Government had never intended to seek an indictment
and ordered the entire transcript released. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
187 F. Supp. 55 (D.N.J. 1960). The use of the grand jury as a civil investigative
tool should be rendered unnecessary by the Antitrust Civil Process Act. See note
62 supra.
83 See United States v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.R.D. 486 (D. Del. 1954)
(applying criminal test to a civil case without a consideration of its appropriateness).
84 United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197, 199, 203 (D.
N.J. 1955).
85 356 U.S. 677 (1958). This was an action for an injunction under the Sherman
Act § 4, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958), following the return
of a "no true bill' against the defendant by the grand jury.
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pursuant to an order granting defendant's motions under rule 6(e) and
rule 34 s6 The Court held that grand jury secrecy would not be breached
except for "compelling necessity" which had to "be shown with particu-
larity." 87 The most important clue to the elusive test for grand jury
release was contained in a dictum that the use of the grand jury minutes to
impeach a witness or to refresh his recollection were "cases of particularized
need where the secrecy . . . is lifted discreetly and limitedly." 8 How-
ever, none of these phrases is particularly helpful in determining when
release should be allowed because the basic problem is one of balancing
the need for release against the reasons for secrecy.
B. A Rationale for Release to Plaintiffs in Antitrust Cases
The electrical equipment cases represent the first attempts by a civil
plaintiff to obtain the grand jury minutes of a civil defendant. Each motion
for release of the grand jury minutes in these cases was met with the argu-
ment that secrecy must be preserved. However, in civil antitrust cases
there are also countervailing policy factors to be considered. The courts
have often emphasized that Congress intended to use the private treble
damage action as a means of enforcing the antitrust laws.8 9  The Second
Circuit has recently said that the private treble damage action supplies
"much of the teeth behind the federal government's attempt to eliminate
anti-competitive practices and to free our economic system from the de-
vitalizing influences of monopoly." 10 Supporting this articulated policy
favoring private enforcement of the antitrust laws is the holding in Doe v.
Rosenberry 91 that rule 6(e) applies to any judicial proceeding which seeks
to require the compliance of a person with standards imposed on private
conduct in the public interest. Under this analysis a private treble damage
action represents a situation where the public interest in allowing release
to further the enforcement of the antitrust laws must be balanced against
the policy of secrecy.92 Moreover, release may be necessary to prevent the
defendant from concealing matters revealed before the grand jury.
86FED. R. CRIm. P. 6(e) ; FEz. R. Cirv. P. 34; see 356 U.S. at 678 nn.1-2.
87 Id. at 682.
88 Id. at 683.
89 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947) ; accord,
United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
90 Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 845
(2d Cir. 1963).
91255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958) ; see text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
92 Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 309 F.2d 440, 444 (3d Cir. 1962), where
the court rejected the FTC argument that Doe v. Rosenberry, mtpra note 91, estab-
lished a settled rule authorizing disclosure to further the law-enforcement functions
of other governmental agencies. The court held that no such rule was established;
that if it were, it would be disregarded; and that Doe v. Rosenberry rested on a
determination that the ends of justice outweighed secrecy. When the plenary investi-
gative powers of the FTC are considered, the result of this case does not militate
against release to a private movant without those powers if the balancing of com-
peting interests is resolved in his favor.
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The problem is what additional advantages should be granted to aid
the civil plaintiff in recovering under the antitrust laws.9 3 Under the
enforcement rationale of Doe v. Rosenberry, there seems to be no legitimate
reason for denying release to any plaintiff, whether or not a governmental
or quasi-governmental agency, if the effect of this added advantage is the
more efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws without a concurrent
emasculation of the grand jury as a criminal investigative device. Where
the benefit gained by aiding the private party, acting as a "private attorney
general," outweighs the harm to the grand jury system, the test of com-
pelling necessity has been met.
C. Formulation of a National Release Process
1. The Initial Motion for Release
During the first deposition under NPTO 10,94 held in Philadelphia,
plaintiffs moved for production of a statement dictated by the deponent
to his employer's counsel immediately after his appearance before the grand
jury.95 The motion was granted, and the deponent's "memory became
sharper and keener than it had been up to that time." 9 6 Plaintiffs then
moved before Judge Clary to inspect deponent's grand jury minutes.
97
In denying release after an in camera examination, the court recognized
the importance of encouraging free disclosure before antitrust grand
juries.9 8 The court stated that secrecy would be preserved as a general
policy except on a showing of "particular compelling need"; 99 however,
the court suggested that the result might have been different if the depo-
nent's grand jury summary had not been available. 00
If the opinion had been confined to plaintiffs' motion to inspect, it
would not have been significant. However, Judge Clary, anticipating future
problems in the onrushing deposition program, continued:
93 These presently include the prima facie effect of criminal verdicts in favor of
the Government, see Clayton Act § 5, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 16 (1958), and the right to recover treble damages plus the costs of the suit including
a reasonable attorney's fee, see Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1958).
4This was the deposition of A. C. Allen, an employee of Wagner Electric Co.,
taken on Oct. 1-3, 1962, before Clary, C.J. and Kirkpatrick, S.J.
95 See OT N219 (Oct. 2, 1962). The transcripts of the national depositions were
filed in each district in which the electrical cases were pending and these transcripts
were serially paginated to provide nationwide uniformity. [The transcripts are cited
herein as follows: the symbol OT will be used for the official transcript (unbound)
and NDT for the private printing (bound) which is being used for filing in the
courts. These statements are hereinafter referred to as grand jury summaries].
96 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 486, 487-88
(E.D. Pa. 1962), appeal dismissed, No. 14296, 3d Cir., Feb. 21, 1963.
97 See OT N355 (Oct. 3, 1962).
98210 F. Supp. at 490-91.
99 Id. at 489. The court also noted that the grand jury minutes should never be
released solely for discovery purposes. Id. at 490.
'0 0 Id. at 491.
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[T] he Grand jury transcript of any witness deposed in this pro-
gram, either in this district or in any other district . . . in which
these cases are pending, should be made available to the deposition
judge for use in his district. There may be and probably will be
many instances during these national depositions when disclosure
may be advisable.' 0 '
He also stated that the refusal to release in this instance did not preclude
release when an in camera examination disclosed material discrepancies
or significant facts which the deponent concealed or failed to remember.
10 2
The opinion then established a procedure for transmitting the grand jury
minutes of any deponent to the deposition judge after the deposition if a
motion for inspection were made, or before the deposition if the judge, on
his own motion, so requested. 03 He was to "contrast the Grand Jury
testimony with the deposition and determine, in his own discretion, whether
in the interest of justice there is compelling need for disclosure." 'D4
Concurrently, an order was entered implementing the procedure for
transmission.'0 5
2. The Initial Decision To Breach Secrecy
This transmission procedure raised a plethora of problems dealing
with grand jury release. At the outset it was improper to have con-
sidered this unprecedented procedure for release to other courts without
benefit of argument of counsel, particularly when no requests for trans-
mission had occurred. However, the transmission procedure seems to
afford adequate protection for secrecy. The initial determination regard-
ing a breach of grand jury secrecy should be made by the court having
jurisdiction over the grand jury. The district court for the District of
Columbia quashed a subpoena duces tecum, served on the Attorney Gen-
eral, to obtain the minutes of plaintiff's testimony before a grand jury
of the District of Massachusetts.?" The case held that the words "the
court" in rule 6(e) '07 allowed release only by the court having jurisdic-
tion over the grand jury, because it is in the best position to determine the
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid. The court can find concealment only when a deponent testifies to a fact
that he had earlier said he did not recall.
1o&Id, at 491.
104 Ibid.
10 5 See Order, City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., Civil No. 29810
and related cases, E.D. Pa., Oct. 23, 1962 [hereinafter all unreported proceedings in
this district will be cited to City of Philadelphia and the date will be given].
106 -erman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 21 F.R.D. 233 (D.D.C.
1957). Subsequently, a similar motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum in the District
of Massachusetts was denied, Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
194 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1958), and apparently inspection was allowed, id. at 765
(senble). See note 80 mipra.
107 FED. R. CRim. P. 6(e).
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policy balance allowing disclosure. 08  The district in which the grand
jury sat has certain local interests, such as protecting the grand jury during
its deliberations and preventing any tampering with witnesses, either before
the grand jury or at trial, in addition to the desire to protect secrecy as a
general policy. Moreover, a local district may take special precautions, not
used in other districts, to encourage the candor of witnesses before its grand
juries. 1 9 However, this initial determination need not include the finding
of particularized need or other standard, but only a finding that, if an
established test for the breach of secrecy can be met in the transferee
district, no considerations particular to the local district will bar release.
It is clear from Judge Clary's opinion that exactly this type of find-
ing was made. The reasons for secrecy were examined, and a finding was
entered that disclosure could be made if a compelling need were shown. 11°
In fact the opinion went even further and suggested possible categories of
factual situations which would constitute such need in the opinion of the
court having jurisdiction over the grand jury."' While this suggestion of
what would constitute a sufficient showing to allow release is probably not
required, it seems to be the preferable procedure since it provides a guide
for the releasing judge.
3. The Requirement of an In Camera Examination
Another aspect of Judge Clary's opinion seems to require that the
deposition judge make an in camera inspection of the minutes before
ordering release." 2  While this is a question of first impression insofar
as it purports to limit another judge to a prescribed procedure, this limita-
tion seems appropriate because it cautions the deposition judge against
permitting release to a party without first examining the minutes and mak-
ing a finding of particularized need. Although an in camera inspection
amounts to a technical breach of secrecy in that a judge who has not seen
the minutes before is allowed to read them, it seems insignificant con-
sidering the federal trial judge's wide range of discretion to inspect material
which is claimed to be privileged.
However, Judge Clary's requirement varies greatly from the rule
in the majority of the circuits that the movant must demonstrate some sort
10821 F.R.D. at 235. In Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940),
decided before the promulgation of rule 6(e), the court held that the responsibility
for release lay with the court having jurisdiction over the grand jury. Accord, In
the Matter of Grand Jury Investigation of the Banana Industry, 214 F. Supp. 856
(D. Md. 1963).
109 This reason is particularly apposite in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
where, unlike other districts, even the grand jury subpoenas are kept secret. See
Application of California To Inspect Grand Jury Subpoenas, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D.
Pa. 1961).
110 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486, 490-91
(E.D. Pa. 1962).
11 See id. at 491.
112 Ibid.
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of need before he can obtain an in camera inspection. 13 Previously, only
the Second Circuit has held such inspection mandatory without any prior
showing of need for release. 1" 4 This question was expressly reserved by
the Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass,115 and is an open question
in some of the circuits. This required in camera inspection makes release
of otherwise unobtainable facts possible, since there were no alternative
routes through which the plaintiffs could discover inconsistencies in a
deponent's prior testimony, while protecting grand jury secrecy by barring
a breach until the inspecting court itself has ascertained the discrepancies
calling for release." 6  In this sense Judge Clary attempted to strike a
balance between the demands of the plaintiffs and the need to protect the
grand juries of his own district.
But, the requirement of a mandatory in camera examination has its
drawbacks. Ordinarily, the burden of showing the need for release rests
with the party seeking it. Under the in camera procedure, the movant
merely indicates what type of statements he is seeking, and the actual dis-
covery of discrepancies or material useful for the purpose of refreshing the
witness' recollection is made by the inspecting judge. Hence, it is the
inspecting judge, 1 and not the movant's counsel, who must determine
whether or not possibly ambiguous statements in the grand jury minutes are
sufficiently important to require release." 8  This procedure also places the
onus of reading what may be a burdensome set of minutes on the deposition
judge.119 Moreover, the difficulties of enforcing this inspection requirement
may destroy its value. A second court may request a transmission of the
minutes and yet refuse to inspect them before release even though the
transmitting court has tried to require such inspection. If it is faced with
113 See, e.g., Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd en
banc, 235 F.2d 664, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956), which requires that the movant
demonstrate that the ends of justice require release, that the motion was timely,
that the trial will not be unduly delayed, that the burden on the judge will not be
excessive, and that he "specify the particular statements he is seeking." Cf. Bary v.
United States, 292 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1961).
114 See United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961) (court of appeals
utilizing its supervisory powers to formulate a rule for its district courts). This
rule has been expressly rejected by other circuits. See Gordan v. United States,
299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Bary v. United States, .pra note 113. Compare
Harrell v. United States, 317 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
115 360 U.S. at 401. Compare United States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 881 (1961).
116 See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233, 237 (1963).
117 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 32 F.R.D. 350, 351-52
(E.D. Pa. 1962).
-118But cf. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 666-72 (1957), disapproving
the practice of submitting Government documents to the trial judge: "[Oinly the
defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective use [of the documents] for
[the] purpose of discrediting the Government's witness . . . ." Id. at 668-69.
However, it has been held that Je ucks does not apply to grand jury minutes. See
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398 (1959).
119 Cf. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 32 F.R.D. 350, 352
(E.D. Pa. 1962) (stating that the comparison of a deponent's grand jury summary,
which is far shorter than the grand jury minutes, with the deposition transcript was
a "considerable burden').
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this dilemma, the court of origin has few weapons with which to enforce
its inspection requirement other than the refusal to transmit further portions
of the minutes or perhaps an action in the nature of mandamus against
the deposition judge. However, the deposition judges should realize that
in order to encourage a general disposition toward complete disclosure
before grand juries, the protection of secrecy through an in camera inspec-
tion is preferable to a direct release of the minutes.
D. The Initial Releases to the Plaintiffs
As a result of Judge Clary's opinion and order, the plaintiffs made a
series of motions during the depositions to obtain the grand jury minutes
of various deponents. Four of these motions were decided in favor of
release by the Hon. George H. Boldt of the Western District of Washing-
ton 120 on the same day,12 1 and established the pattern for all future releases
based on Judge Clary's order.'2 In two of these situations, he sat as a
special master,las and in the other two as a district judge sitting by
designation. 124 In three of them the entire transcripts of the respective
deponents' grand jury testimony were released on the bases that: (1)
120 Judge Boldt has played a unique role in these cases, both as a member of
the Murrah Committee and as the judge before whom the bulk of the first round
depositions were taken, even though these depositions were taken in New York,
Chicago, and Miami.
1 1 See Order on Motion for Release of Deponent's Grand Jury Testimony,
In the Matter of the National Deposition of John T. Peters, Civil No. 61-4264 and
related cases, S.D.N.Y., Dec. 18, 1962 (Boldt, Special Master), approved and con-
firmed, Dec. 20, 1962, S.D.N.Y. (Ryan, C.J.), petition for leave to appeal or in the
alternative for a writ of mndamus denied sub norn. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A. B.
Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 1963) (per curiam) (appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1958)), appeal dismissed, 7th Cir., April 19, 1963 (appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1958)), application, for stay denied, 83 Sup. Ct 964 (April 10, 1963) (Harlan,
J., in chambers) [hereinafter cited as In re Peters]; In the Matter of the National
Deposition of Brenan R. Sellers, 32 F.R.D. 473, 475 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1963) (Boldt,
J., sitting by assignment), petition for leave to appeal or in the alternative for a writ
of iandamuts denied, No. 14027, 7th Cir., Feb. 5, 1963 (appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1958)), appeal dismissed, 7th Cir., April 19, 1963 (appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1958)) [hereinafter cited as In re Sellers]; Order on Motion for Release
of Deponent's Grand Jury Testimony, In the Matter of the National Deposition of
Donald J. Nairn, Civil No. 29810 and related cases, E.D. Pa., Dec. 18, 1962 (Boldt, J.,
sitting by assignment in the Northern District of Illinois), approved and confirmed,
Dec. 20, 1962, E.D. Pa. (Clary, C.J.), petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus
denied sub nora. Nairn v. Clary, 312 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. Jan. 23, 1963) (per curiam),
petition for rehearing denied on other grounds, id. (March 13, 1963), appeal disminssed,
No. 14319, 3d Cir. Feb. 21, 1963 (appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958)) [hereinafter
cited as In re Nairn] ; Order on Motion for Release of Deponent's Grand Jury Testi-
mony, In the Matter of the National Deposition of J. W. McMullen, Civil No.
11135M, S.D. Fla., Dec. 18, 1962 (Boldt, Special Master), approved and confirmed,
S.D. Fla., Dec. 20, 1962 (Dyer, C.J.), aff'd sub norn. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
City of Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1963) [hereinafter cited as City of Fort
Pierce].
122 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 153-65 infra (Burke).
M These were the depositions of John T. Peters, a GE employee, taken in New
York, and of J. W. McMullen, an Allis-Chalmers employee, taken in Miami.
124 These were the depositions of Brenan R. Sellers, a Carrier Corporation em-
ployee, and Donald J. Nairn, an Allis-Chalmers employee, taken in Chicago, although
the order releasing Nairn's testimony was entered in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, apparently to allow an appeal from that district.
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segregation was "highly impracticable"; (2) that "there is no indication
that any portion . . . need be withheld as being 'merely for discovery'
purposes"; and (3) because a "particular compelling need" had been
shown, the "end of justice" required release. 125 In the fourth case the
same recitals were made and the same reasons were advanced, but only
portions of the grand jury minutes were released.1 6 In each instance the
order recited the finding that an in camera examination revealed "many
facts of vital importance to essential issues . . . which were not recalled
or were denied by deponent in his deposition testimony." ' 7  Since the
minutes were sought for use in discovery, the holding that they were not
sought solely for discovery purposes seems questionable. However, Judge
Boldt considered these depositions as "trial depositions" because they were
being taken pursuant to rule 26(d)."-8 The need for release was as great
at the deposition as it would be at trial because the depositions might con-
stitute the major evidence at the trial of many of these cases32m The same
supporting memorandum was filed with respect to each of these orders.
In essence the memorandum merely recited the tests set forth in the leading
Supreme Court cases, with particular emphasis on Procter & Gamble
which Judge Boldt said did not foreclose all release but only release as a
substitute for discovery.'3 0 He also held that release was proper in a civil
treble damage action, stating that there was no doubt that such an action
was a proceeding seeking the compliance of a person "with standards im-
posed upon his conduct in the public interest" within the meaning of Doe
v. Rosenberry.'3 1
In the two cases in which Judge Boldt presided over the deposition as
a judge, it was proper for him to order release since Judge Clary could
delegate the finding of particularized need to a judge of coordinate juris-
diction.132 This process was essential to the success of the national deposi-
tion program because it avoided the delay and waste of effort concomitant
to a hearing in Philadelphia before a judge who was unfamiliar with the
prior deposition testimony. However, several complications arise in the
two cases in which Judge Boldt presided over the depositions as a special
master of the district in which the depositions were taken. Even though he
is a judge, he was not, at that time, a judge of that district by virtue of an
125 It re Sellers, 32 F.R.D. 473, 475 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ; Order, p. 3, It re Peters,
Dec. 18, 1962; Order, p. 3, In re Nairn, Dec. 18, 1962.
126 Order, pp. 1-3, City of Fort Pierce, Dec. 18, 1962.
327 In re Sellers, 32 F.R.D. 473, 475 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ; Order, p. 2, In re Peters,
Dec. 18, 1962; Order, p. 2, In re Nairn, Dec. 18, 1962; Order, p. 2, City of Fort
Pierce, Dec. 18, 1962.
= See, e.g., Ip re Sellers, 32 F.R.D. 473, 476-77 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
129 See id. at 477.
130 See id. at 475-76
'13 See id. at 477.
132 See Hearing Relating to Grand jury Procedures, p. 4, City of Philadelphia,
Nov. 13, 1962 (remarks of Clary, C.J., in chambers).
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intercircuit assignment pursuant to the Judicial Code, 33 and his powers
were only those of a master.
1. Master's Authority To Release Grand Jury Minutes
Traditionally, the courts have had inherent power to use a master,
absent contrary legislation.13 4 However, this power has been limited by
the holdings, now codified in rule 53(b),13 that references could be made
only in the exceptional case or where the issues were complicated. 13 6  In
La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 1 3 7 the Supreme Court held improper the
reference of an entire antitrust case to a master to take evidence, make find-
ings of fact, and submit conclusions of law because it had the effect of
denying the parties a trial before the court on the merits. 3 8 However, one
court has held that La Buy applies only to trial references and does not
foreclose the use of a master in pretrial discovery,' 39 and several authorities
have recommended this procedure, particularly in protracted cases.140
The advantage of a discovery master is that he can reduce the burdens
on the court by ruling on questions of relevance and privilege without any
significant abdication of the judicial function, particularly if the reference
to the master provides for immediate review of any order by a district judge
if the parties seek it.' 4 ' Discovery masters have been employed when the
size and complexity of the case indicated a massive discovery process 142 or
when discovery in distant places was necessary.143  However, a motion to
appoint a federal judge to supervise discovery has been denied on the
ground that the court was so burdened with protracted litigation that the
133 See 28 U.S.C. § 292(c) (1958). A judge sitting by assignment has all the
powers of a judge of the court to which he is assigned. 28 U.S.C. § 296 (1958).
'34 See Ex pare Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920). See generally Kaufman,
Masters in the Federal Courts: Ride 53, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 452 (1958).
135 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). Compare Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
136Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701 (1927).
137 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
138 Id. at 256; see McMullogh v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634 (1940) (per curiam
issuance of a writ of mandamus to vacate a reference of a case to a master for trial).
'S9 First Iowa Hydro Elec. Co-op. v. Iowa-Ill. Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1958) ; see Kaufman, supra note 134, at 465.
140 See Handbook 390 (1960). One authority has recommended the use of stand-
ing masters to supervise all discovery. See Weinstein, Standing Masters to Supervise
Discovery in the Southern District, New York, 23 F.R.D. 36 (1958). At least two
districts have adopted this suggestion in part. See 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE ir 26.38,
at 1787-89 (2d ed. 1963). See also Kaufman, supra note 134, at 463-64.
'4' See Handbook 390-94 (1960) ; MOORE, op. cit. supra note 140, at 1783-84,
1787 (discussing Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co. (unreported)); Marsh, Pre-Trial
Discovery in an Anti-Trust Case, 8 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 401, 411 (1953) (discussing
Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co.).
142 The classic example of this procedure is the Ferguson case. See ibid.
' 43 See Olson Transp. Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 7 F.R.D. 134 (E.D. Wis.
1944) (master to supervise depositions to be taken 115 miles from where the court
would be sitting) ; Marsh, supra note 141, at 409; cf. Bair v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 112 F.2d 247 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 684 (1940)
(postjudgment proceedings).
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appointment would only postpone the proceedings. 144 Although rule 53
does not exlicitly provide for reference of discovery matters to a master,
rule 53(c) 145 has been used to define the powers of a master appointed
to supervise discovery proceedings. 146 Under this rule a master has ruled
on production of documents, 147 questions of privilege 148 and materiality,149
as well as matters involving trade secrets, relevance, good cause, and the
protection of witnesses. 15 0
Despite these broad powers in discovery, it would seem that the
determination of "particularized need" or "compelling necessity" for
release of grand jury minutes is not properly allocated to a master. The
determination demands a precise balancing of the factors allowing release
against the policy of protecting the grand jury as an instrument of the
criminal process. Because of its importance, the decision should be made
by the local court itself, or at least by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction, who
would be accustomed to weighing the same policy arguments in his own
district. Moreover, mere approval of a master's release order by a district
judge is not a sufficient protection for grand jury secrecy because the
master's examination of the minutes is a breach of secrecy and because the
master might release the minutes to the movant before the judge has re-
viewed the order.
In two cases Judge Boldt's release orders were entered under his au-
thority as a master,I51 and would constitute reversible error under the
preceding analysis. However, since he is a federal judge familiar with the
balancing problem involved, his action under his authority as a master is
probably an insignificant error. But the difficult problem of the authority
of the nonjudicial master in discovery still persists. In these instances the
144 Budget Dress Corp. v. Joint Bd. of Dress & Waistmakers' Union, 24 F.R.D.
506 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Ryan, C.J.).
14
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c). Basically, this rule provides that the powers of the
master can be limited by the order of reference, and that in the absence of such
limitation, the master
has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing
before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for
the efficient performance of his duties under the order. He may require the
production . . . of evidence . . . including . . . books, papers, vouchers,
documents, and writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the admissi-
bility of evidence ....
146See First Iowa Hydro Elec. Co-op. v. Iowa-Ill. Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d
613 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957).
147 See ibid.
148 See Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 833 (1956) ; Marsh, supra note 141, at 406.
149 Olson Transp. Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 7 F.R.D. 134, 136 (E.D.
Wis. 1944) ; Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 28 F. Supp. 665 (D. Del. 1939).
150 See Marsh, supra note 141, at 404.
-11 See Letter from Hon. Jean S. Breitenstein, Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Inter-
Circuit Assignments of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, Jan. 29, 1964. "Inter-circuit assignments have been
made in the national deposition program . . . in order that the judge presiding over
the taking of a deposition may have full judicial power rather than the more limited
power of a master." Ibid.
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question of who releases the minutes is not a mere technicality, as it was
when Judge Boldt sat as a master, but a matter concerning the allocation
of powers between the master as an aid to the judge and the judge
himself.
152
2. An Example of Plaintiffs' Difficulties in Obtaining Release
A subsequent order entered by Judge Boldt presents the complexities
of obtaining grand jury release in this litigation. Prior to his national
deposition, the deponent '53 had testified three times before the grand
juries '4 and had been twice deposed locally.155  A motion for release,
made prior to the national deposition, was based on his local deposition
testimony that he did not remember any price fixing at the Traymore Hotel
meeting of competitors,' 56  although other local deponents had given con-
tradictory testimony.157 An argument on this motion before Judge Kirk-
patrick resulted in the production of deponent's grand jury summaries and
in the granting of an in camera examination of the minutes.158 Subse-
quently, the parties stipulated that Judge Boldt would examine the minutes
and decide the motion on the basis of the prior argument. 59 The motion
152 A similar problem arises in In re Nairn, in which Judge Boldt presided as
a judge by assignment in the Northern District of Illinois, see Letter from Hon.
Jean S. Breitenstein to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Feb. 17, 1964,
because the release order was entered in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to which
Judge Boldt had not been assigned. See Order on Motion for Release of Deponent's
Grand Jury Testimony, p. 4, In re Nairn, approved and confirmed, Dec. 20, 1962
(Clary, C.J.). Judge Boldt had authority to enter the order in the district to which
he had been assigned even though the assignment had expired, see 28 U.S.C. § 296
(1958), and the entry in another district where other electrical cases were pending
should not affect the order since it was based on a finding of need made by a judge
of coordinate jurisdiction.
353 The deponent was C. E. Burke, a former employee of General Electric and
tenth witness in the first round, whose deposition was taken before Judge Boldt
sitting by assignment. See OT N5161, 15 NDT 314. Burke had pleaded guilty to
the indictment in United States v. General Elec. Co., Criminal No. 20235, E.D. Pa.,
Feb. 7, 1961, and had been sentenced to a fine of $3,500 and thirty days in jail,
although the jail sentence was suspended because of his cooperation with the court.
See Hearing on Sentences, pp. 715-16, United States v. General Elec. Co., supra.
'54 These appearances were on Feb. 9 and June 21, 1960, see 68 NDT 98 (Oct.
14, 1963), and May 16, 1960, see NX 1082 in 68 NDT [exhibits to the national
depositions are designated "NX" with a given number, and the volume in which they
appear is indicated].
155 See Pretrial Examination of C. E. Burke, Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. General
Elec. Co., Civil No. 5271, W.D. Wash., Nov. 27, 1961; Pretrial Examination of
C. E. Burke, City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Civil No. 29931 and
related cases, E.D. Pa., June 23, 1962, July 7, 1962 [hereinafter cited as Burke,
Phila. Dep.]. These two local depositions were taken in the respective local districts
before the national deposition program was instituted.
156 See Burke, Phila. Dep. 2568-78 (July 7, 1962). He admitted that he was
present at the meeting, -which took place on Nov. 9, 1958. Id. at 2566.
157 See Motion for Production and Inspection of the Grand Jury Testimony and
Statements of C. E. Burke, E.D. Pa., Oct. 26, 1962.
158 See Hearing on Motion, pp. 42-45, City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., Civil No. 29931 and related cases, E.D. Pa., Nov. 20, 1962. This hearing
was marked by statements that Burke had intentionally tried to forget the facts, id.
at 3-5 (statement of Harold Kohn, Esq., counsel for plaintiffs), and that Burke had
lied to his employer's counsel on two occasions, id. at 15 (statement of Henry W.
Sawyer, Esq., counsel for defendant General Electric).
159 See OT N4647, 15 NDT 4 (Nov. 27, 1962).
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was denied by Judge Boldt because there had been no showing of "any
need, let alone a particular compelling need." 160
Following the close of this deposition, plaintiffs were granted a further
examination of the deponent on the basis of his grand jury summaries.
16 '
During the second examination, deponent reasserted his denials of price
fixing despite statements to the contrary in his grand jury summaries; 162
on the basis of these inconsistencies plaintiffs moved for the production of
the deponent's grand jury minutes.163 After a second in camera examina-
tion,' Judge Boldt released certain portions of two of the transcripts of the
minutes on the grounds that the conflict between the two sets of testimony
showed a "particular need . . . and that the ends of justice require
[production) . ".1..1,165
IV. THE DILEmMA OF REVIEW IN MULTIPLE LITIGATION
A. The Attempts To Appeal From Judge Clary's Order
1. Section 1292(b)
Following the entry of the order establishing the transmission pro-
cedure, Judge Clary denied a motion for a rehearing, but did certify the
order for an interlocutory appeal 166 pursuant to section 1292(b) of the
Judicial Code; 167 however, neither defense counsel nor the judge himself
could see how an appeal would "materially advance the ultimate termina-
160 See OT N5161-62, 15 NDT 315 (Nov. 28, 1962).
161 See Order Granting Application for Further Examination of Deponent C. E.
Burke, In the Matter of the National Deposition of C. E. Burke, Civil No. 29810 and
related cases, E.D. Pa., July 23, 1963 (Boldt, J.), approved and confirmed, July 25,
1963 (Clary, C.J.) [hereinafter cited as In re Burke]. The summaries had not been
produced during the initial deposition due to a delay caused by appellate review.
Ibid. The summaries are NX 1081-83 in 68 NDT.
162 See, e.g., OT N20710-19, 68 NDT 35-41 (Sept 20, 1963). Burke was read
portions of a memorandum of his activities prepared by General Electric's counsel
on April 7, 1960, which stated that the "purpose of the meeting was to bring about
stabilization of prices at a fair level," and that the market for the sealed-bid business
in power circuit breakers had been divided. Burke contradicted this and stated that
the meeting had not been to stabilize prices, and that a division of bids had been tried
but was ineffective. Burke made similar responses to contradictory statements in
NX 1082, p. 16, in 68 NDT, which he stated was a "falsified paper" in which he had
made up some questions and answers and had not tried to tell defense counsel the
truth. See OT N20736-37, N20750, 68 NDT 51, 59.
163 See OT N20760-61, 68 NDT 66.
164 See OT N20802, 68 NDT 92.
165 See Memorandum & Order for Release of Deponent's Grand Jury Testimony,
I re Burke, Sept 27, 1963.
166 See Transcript of Pretrial Hearing, City of Philadelphia, Nov. 9, 1962.
16728 U.S.C. §1292(b) (1958), which provides in part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may ma-
terially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state
in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its dis-
cretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made
to it within ten days after the entry of the order ....
See generally 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 140, 1l 26.37, 26.38, at 1711-89 (2d ed.
1963) ; Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. Rzv. 351 (1961).
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tion of the litigation." 168 Although no appeal was taken from Judge Clary's
order under section 1292 (b), the difficulties of maintaining an interlocutory
appeal from such an order must be considered because of the frequent at-
tempts to use section 1292(b) to avoid the practical nonreviewability of
discovery orders. 1 9
Section 1292(b) seems to be of little help to the party seeking review
of a pretrial order because of the narrow limitations of the statute. Such
an order rarely presents an issue whose resolution will materially terminate
the litigation. Moreover, because of the discretionary nature of discovery
orders, they rarely constitute controlling questions of law.170 While certain
orders denying discovery may force plaintiff to abandon his suit and obtain
review of the discovery order on appeal from a nonsuit, as he could before
section 1292 (b) was enacted,' 17 the defendant is often unable to show any
terminating effect even if the challenged order is improper.
2. Section 1291 and the Collateral Order Doctrine
Section 1291,172 on which the appeal from Judge Clary's order was based,
apparently on the theory that his order was final and collateral, 73 presents
106 See Hearing Relating to Grand Jury Procedures, p. 2, City of Phila., Nov.
13, 1962 (Clary, C.J., in chambers). Defendant Westinghouse Electric Company's
counsel, John G. Harkins, Jr., stated that defendants did not feel that they could "in
good conscience . . . say that an appeal . . .would materially advance the Phila-
delphia cases," a statement with which Judge Clary agreed.
109 Section 1292(b) was designed to permit the disposition of vital questions in
protracted cases, such as a statute of limitations question in an antitrust case, before
final judgment. See H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958); S. REP.
No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958). However, the Judicial Conference limited
the scope of the section before it was presented to Congress by adopting the sug-
gestion of Judge Charles E. Clark in striking the language "terminate the litigation
or is necessary to the prompt or efficient administration of justice" in favor of the
present "materially advance the ultimate termination" language. See H.R. REP No.
1667, supra at 4-5, reprinting the Report to the Judicial Conference of the Tenth
Circuit (July 16, 1953).
Discovery orders do not usually dispose of the proceedings or any part thereof,
and, therefore, are not immediately appealable. See 4 MOoRE, op. cit. supra note 140,
1126.37, at 1712. However, effective review of discovery orders after a decision on
the merits is virtually impossible, since such orders, even if incorrect, do not often
constitute grounds for reversal. See Note, 75 H, v. L. REv. 351, 352 (1961). This
is particularly true where discovery is denied and the basis of appeal is an inadequate
preparation for trial because of the denial, or where discovery is allowed and the
successful movant's case appears to be sufficient to support the verdict without the
improperly discovered material.
170 Cf. United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959) (leave to appeal
from an order striking the Government's counterclaim and answer after a refusal
to produce certain documents under a claim of privilege denied); Seven-Up Co. v.
O-So-Grape Co., 179 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Ill. 1959).
17' See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 680 (1958) (Gov-
ernment took a voluntary nonsuit rather than produce the grand jury minutes and
then appealed). Professor Moore argues that the courts should permit § 1292(b)
appeals from orders denying a claim of privilege or directing disclosure of grand
jury minutes to avoid placing on counsel the "uninviting choice of either being
adjudged in contempt or having his action dismissed .... " 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra
note 140, T26.37171, at 1769-71.
17228 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958) ("courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts . ... ).
173 See Hearing Relating to Grand Jury Procedures, p. 3, City of Philadelphia,
Nov. 13, 1962.
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an equally unlikely vehicle for review of discovery orders. The preliminary
nature of such orders does not comport with the basic concept of section
1291 that appeals are allowed only from final decisions 174 to avoid a piece-
meal process of litigation.175 Thus, courts have held that the denial of a
motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum is not appealable since the sub-
poenaed party can refuse to appear or to produce the documents and then
appeal from the sanction imposed for such failure.176  One court has held
that "rulings on the propriety or impropriety of deposition taking . . .
are not 'final decisions' within [section 1291] .... ,, 177
However, the "refuse and take sanction" theory is inapplicable when
the party asserting a privilege in a discovery proceeding is not the party
from whom the information is sought. In this situation an appeal has been
allowed from an order denying the claim of privilege because the privilege
is meaningless after production, and the party claiming the privilege cannot
withhold the documents to gain an appeal. 178  In addition to this small
exception the courts have allowed immediate appeals from
that small class [of decisions] which finally determine claims
of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of
the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated.
179
This "collateral order doctrine" has also been utilized to permit appeal when
an exercise of discretion is not involved or when the rights claimed will be
irreparably lost by delay. 80
These two exceptions to the final order doctrine provide a rationale for
allowing an immediate appeal from an order releasing grand jury minutes.
It is obvious that grand jury secrecy is meaningless once the minutes are
released even if this release should subsequently be found to be error, and
that secrecy can be protected only by allowing an appeal before such release
occurs. Since the minutes are not in the possession of the objecting party,
he cannot refuse to produce them and obtain an immediate appeal from the
374 See, e.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945). Compare Hori-
zons Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1961) (order quashing
a subpoena duces tecum held final and appealable since there were no other proceed-
ings between the parties in that or any other district).
'75 Cf. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 123 (1962).
176 See, e.g., Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). This theory
ignores the fact that many of the sanctions available under FED. R. CIV. P. 37 for
such failure to produce or appear are not final and appealable in the same manner
as a citation for contempt. See Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 287
F.2d 324, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1961) ; 4 MoORE, op. cit. supra note 140, 1126.37, at 1727-37.
177 Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 323 F.2d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 1963).
178 See Overby v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1955);
Note, 75 HAgv. L. RFv. 351, 364-65 n.118 (1961).
179 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
180Id, at 546-47. Compare Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del
Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950) (allowing an immediate appeal from an order
dissolving an attachment).
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sanction imposed by the court. Moreover, the party objecting to the
release is asserting that release will be prejudicial to the grand jury as an
institution, a claim which is separable from any other issues in the case and
"too important to be denied review." Thus, while an order denying pro-
duction would be denied immediate review since it affects only the movant's
ability to prepare for trial, an order allowing inspection should be imme-
diately appealable as a collateral order to protect grand jury secrecy.
However, the appeal from Judge Clary's order pursuant to section 1291
was dismissed without opinion on the grounds that the order was interlocu-
tory and that the defendants lacked standing to appeal,,, Judge Clary's
order was interlocutory insofar as it denied the release of the deponent's
grand jury minutes, but it was collateral insofar as it established a procedure
for future releases because it was clearly separable from the merits of the
case and raised the issue whether Judge Clary could properly delegate the
finding of particularized need to a judge in another district. However, this
order was not final because the defendants could show no loss of right until
Judge Clary entered an order transmitting the minutes to another judge. If
the Third Circuit meant that the defendants did not have standing to appeal
because they could show no present harm from Judge Clary's order, then
the decision is correct. However, if the court meant that the defendants
would not be proper parties to object to a release order or to a future
transmission order, then the question of standing was incorrectly decided.
In order to provide the court with an, adversary argument on the merits
governing production and to afford the maximum possible protection to
grand jury secrecy, either the grand jury witness' 82 or any party '1 has
usually been given standing to contest an order directing production, or to
appeal from an order denying production, 8 4 and even persons who were
not parties have been allowed to object.'
8 5
While this rationale would not support an appeal from Judge Clary's
order, it would suggest appellate review of the propriety of the transmission
procedure. Review could be secured by appealing from the first order
actually transmitting the minutes to another judge because this order
would involve the claim that only a judge of the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania could release the minutes, because the order would be separable
from the merits of the case, and because immediate review would avoid a
later invalidation of the transmission process which might emasculate the
national program.
181 Order, City of Philadelphia, No. 14296, 3d Cir., Feb. 21, 1963.
12 Cf. Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958).
138 Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 763 (D.
Mass. 1958).
-84 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
185 See In the Matter of Special 1952 Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 102 (E.D. Pa.
1958) (motion for production in a private treble damage action opposed by the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department).
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Since the defendants neither appealed the subsequent transmission
orders nor sought a section 1292(b) certificate,'8 6 they foreclosed any
challenge to the order transmitting the earlier sets of minutes. While the
passage of time and the use of the transmission procedure might not
preclude an appeal from subsequent transmission orders, it seems unlikely
that the Third Circuit would "upset the apple cart" by sustaining a challenge
to the transmission procedure at this late date because such a decision
would cast doubt on a number of depositions which had already been taken
involving the use of grand jury minutes transmitted to another district.
In short the transmission procedure established by Judge Clary has be-
come the law of the electrical cases and perhaps of the future.
B. Appellate Review of Judge Boldt's Orders
1. Release While Acting as a Judge
In one of two instances where Judge Boldt presided over the deposi-
tions while sitting as a district judge by assignment, the Seventh Circuit
rejected the defendant's three attempts to appeal without opinion. 8 7 The
Third Circuit denied leave to appeal under section 1292(b) from the other
instance of release because the orders did not involve a controlling question
of law and an immediate appeal would not materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation.' 88 In addition the court dismissed the section
1291 appeal on the grounds that the order was interlocutory and that the
defendants lacked standing to appeal.18 9 This decision seems incorrect in
light of the suggested rationale for allowing an appeal from Judge Clary's
transmission orders because the defendants did have standing to challenge
the release order, and it would seem to be final within the meaning of the
collateral order doctrine. Moreover, the need for appeal seems even greater
in these cases than in the transmission cases because of the far greater
scope of the breach of secrecy.
The defendants also petitioned the Third Circuit for writs of prohibi-
tion and mandamus 190 either to restrain Judge Boldt from releasing the
minutes and Judge Clary from "approving and confirming" that order, or
to force Judge Clary to vacate his order transmitting the minutes to Judge
186 See Order, City of Philadelphia, Nov. 15, 1962, which transmits the minutes of
deponents Sellers and Nairn to the Honorable George H. Boldt. The docket indi-
cates no attempt to appeal from this order.
187 See Order, In re Sellers, No. 14027, 7th Cir., Feb. 5, 1963 (leave to appeal
under § 1292(b) and writ of mandamus denied); Order, In re Sellers, No. 14027,
7th Cir., April 19, 1963 (appeal under § 1291 dismissed).
188 Order re Application for Leave To Appeal, In re Nairn, No. 14301, 3d Cir.,
Jan. 23, 1963.
189 Order, City of Philadelphia, No. 14296, 3d Cir., Feb. 21, 1963 (dismissing a
§ 1291 appeal in the same order which dismissed the § 1291 appeal from Judge Clary's
original order).
190 See Nairn v. Clary, 312 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. Jan. 23, 1963) (per curiam), peti-
tions for rehearing denied on other grounds, id. (March 13, 1963); 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1958).
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Boldt and to restrain the latter from releasing them.19 1 This petition was
initially denied on the basis that the appellants did not have standing to
raise the issues presented by the petition.19 2 However, the court may have
belatedly recognized the error in this position when it denied a motion for
rehearing en banc because the two judges had neither exceeded their juris-
diction nor abused their discretion. 19 3 This reaction to the petition for
mandamus seems correct. If the order is final, then mandamus or its
equivalent would not lie because the proper method of appeal would be
section 1291. Mandamus is proper only to remove obstacles to appellate
jurisdiction and is not a substitute therefor.
194
However, mandamus may be proper if the order is treated as inter-
locutory. Prior to 1946, mandamus and prohibition were the only means
for the review of interlocutory orders, 19 5 and they were applied to discovery
orders.' 96 This mode of appeal has been allowed even after the enact-
ment of section 1292(b) 117 and seems to be particularly appropriate for
orders which are not within the limited scope of section 1292(b) but
which require immediate appellate consideration. In Atlass v. Miner,198
mandamus was held to lie to vacate discovery orders entered pursuant to
an invalid local district court rule since review on final judgment would
be "clearly inadequate." Similarly, mandamus has been granted to vacate
orders granting discovery of trade secrets since discovery would destroy
their value, even though appellant's sole contention was that the trial court
abused its discretion. 99 There is a close parallel between Atlass and the
instant situation since Judge Clary's order is similar to a local rule and
since Judge Boldt's order is the equivalent of a discovery order under that
procedure. Hence, mandamus would have been an appropriate vehicle
to allow the Third Circuit to evaluate both the release procedure and the
underlying transmission process involved in the national deposition pro-
gram. However, the court held that mandamus would not lie because the
district court had not abused its discretion.
20 0
'o' Under this theory the defendants would allege that judge Boldt did not have
authority to release the minutes because the underlying transmission order was a
manifest abuse of discretion by Judge Clary.
192 Nairn v. Clary, 312 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1963).
'93 Ibid.
'94 See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943). Compare La Buy
v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957).
'95 See Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 351 (1961).
'
9 6 See National Bondholders Corp. v. McClintic, 99 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1938).
'97 Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist Court, 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961);
see Atlass v. Miner, 265 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
'98265 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
'99 Hartley Pen Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 287 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1961)
(trial court abused discretion since party seeking production had failed to show the
relevance of the secrets sought).
200 See 312 F.2d at 748 (by implication). The court cites Pennsylvania R.R. v Kirk-
patrick, 203 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953), in which mandamus to review an order directing
production of a statement given by plaintiff to defendant's claim agent was denied
because it was the trial court's function to determine good cause and its decision
would not be reversed, even if erroneous.
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2. Release While Acting as a Master
In response to the first appeal from a release order entered by Judge
Boldt sitting as a special master, the Second Circuit denied leave to appeal
under section 1292(b) and a petition for a writ of mandamus, as well as dis-
missing the appeal under section 1291.201 The court held that it had
jurisdiction to review the release order despite its dependence on Judge
Clary's order, but seemed to treat the transmission procedure as the settled
law of the case. 22 The court held that Judge Boldt was in the most favor-
able position to determine the need for release, and that immediate inter-
locutory review was proper only if he had manifestly abused his discretion,
which the court held he had not done.20 3 Although the court indicated that
it was aware that Judge Boldt acted as a master, it did not discuss whether
this fact was relevant to its decision. However, the case should not be
treated as implying that the finding of particularized need can be delegated
to a master because the court referred to the finding as one "involving the
discretion of the judge in conducting pretrial discovery proceedings".204
and probably did not consider either the problem of Judge Boldt's authority
as a master or the problem of the nonjudicial master. Subsequently, an
application for a stay pending certiorari was denied by Mr. Justice
Harlan.
205
The second reaction to a release order entered by Judge Boldt while
sitting as a special master resulted in the granting of leave to appeal under
section 1292(b).206 On appeal the Fifth Circuit held that the question
whether appeal was proper in that circuit was foreclosed by the granting
of leave to appeal. 20 7 Treating the issue as being whether the proper
standards for release had been met, the court held, inter alia, that release
was proper to refresh a witness' recollection or to show inconsistencies in
a witness' story. 08 The court stated that release was properly left to the
discretion of the district court, and that there was no showing that such
discretion had been abused.20 9 The court did not discuss the scope of
201 Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A. B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. Jan. 31,
1963), appeal dismissed, March 21, 1963, application for stay denied, 83 Sup. Ct. 964
(April 10, 1963) (Harlan, J., in chambers).
202 Id. at 434.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 83 Sup. Ct at 964. Justice Harlan dissented in Procter & Gamble, see 356
U.S. at 685-90, treating the issue as being one of abuse of discretion, as did the Second
Circuit in the instant case.
2 06 See Order on Application of Defendants For Leave To Appeal From an
Interlocutory Order, City of Fort Pierce, No. 20345, 5th Cir., Feb. 18, 1963.
207 See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233, 237 (5th
Cir. 1963).
208 Id. at 238, 241. The court's approach to the problem was extremely perceptive
in that the court realized that no showing of alternative routes of discovery had or
could have been made, id. at 237, that the criminal tests were only roughly analogous
to the civil tests, id. at 237-38, and that the problem was not one of applying rigid
tests but of balancing competing policies, id. at 238.
209 Id. at 242.
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Judge Boldt's powers as a special master, apparently relying on the ap-
proval and confirmation by Chief Judge Dyer 2 10 despite Judge Cameron's
insistence in his dissent that only a judge could order release, and that the
approval of a master's order by a judge is not sufficient.211
V. THE OPERATION OF THE RELEASE PROCESS
Historically, the criteria for release of "particularized need," "com-
pelling necessity," and "the ends of justice" have derived their substance
from the advantage to be gained by the party seeking release and from the
proposed use of the minutes-to refresh or impeach. The particular nature
of the facts revealed by release have usually been unascertainable because
the minutes were not made a part of the actual trial transcript unless
used to impeach. However, in the electrical equipment cases, the grand
jury minutes have been used to refresh the deponent's recollection, and in
some instances the minutes have been read into the record. These cases
offer a unique opportunity for determining what vital facts were sufficient
to establish a "particularized need" and for evaluating the possible uses
to which the released minutes can be put.
A. An Instance of Particularized Need
In the first reexamination after release of the grand jury minutes,
21 2
the deponent stated that he did not remember those present or the details
of a competitors' meeting at a particular National Electrical Manufac-
turers' Association meeting.213 He was shown his grand jury minutes to
refresh his recollection, and he testified that he then remembered one par-
ticipant in the meeting.2 14 The court then granted plaintiffs' motion to
read into the record the deponent's grand jury testimony that two other
men attended the meeting on the basis that it constituted past recollec-
tion recorded 15 Subsequently, he stated that the testimony so read
represented his best recollection at that time, and that nothing had hap-
pened since then to make him doubt the accuracy of his answers.
21 6
210 Id. at 234.
211 Id. at 244 n.1 (Cameron, J., dissenting). The balance of the dissent states
that the size of the litigation is not particularized need, id. at 242, that no particularized
need was shown before Judge Clary released the minutes to the master, id. at 243,
and that the movant must show some sort of "need of the particular witness' testi-
niony before the transcript is released," id. at 244.
212 This was the reexamination of Donald J. Nairn, taken in New York on
Sept. 23-24, 1963, before Judge Boldt.
213 See OT N20854, N20879-80, 69 NDT 29, 44 (Sept 23, 1963). This accorded
with his original deposition testimony. See OT N4312, 14 NDT 85 (Nov. 15, 1962).
214 See OT N20880-81, N20884, 69 NDT 44-45, 47. This colleague was R. N.
Meirs.
2 1 5 See OT N20881, 69 NDT 45. His grand jury transcript indicated that Messrs.
Meirs, Jenkins, Mauntel, and Nairn were present. Ibid. Deponent was also shown
NX 1087, item 8, in 69 NDT (Supplemental Answers of Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories), which he stated did not refresh his recollection. NX
1087 indicated that Messrs. Eikner, Sellers, Reinking, Darling, and possibly Bauer
or Healy were also present
216 See OT N20894, 69 NDT 53.
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On eight occasions during the balance of the reexamination, the de-
ponent stated that the grand jury minutes did refresh his recollection.
21 7
However, when the deponent failed to recall certain relevant details and
on the twenty-nine additional occasions when the minutes did not refesh
his recollection, the relevant portions were read into the record as past
recollection recorded 2 18 The particularized need of refreshing the de-
ponent is amply revealed by the minutes and justifies the release, even
though this need was initially discovered by the judge, who compared the
minutes with the deposition transcript, and not by the movant.21 9 The
instances in which the minutes were read into the deposition record reveal
facts concerning persons present at meetings of competitors, agreements to
rig bids and divide markets, specific bids discussed and agreements
reached, and general policy discussions aimed at maintaining the conspiracy.
However, one of Judge Boldt's release orders resulted in an unneces-
sary breach of secrecy.? 0 In this case he denied a reexamination of the
217 These instances relate to the following matters and occur at the following
pages: (a) December 1957 meeting in New York re persons present and jobs dis-
cussed, OT N20924, 69 NDT 69; (b) February 1958 meeting at the Edgewater Beach
Hotel and jobs discussed, OT N20929-32, 69 NDT 72-73; (c) March 1958 meeting
at the Sherman Hotel re jobs discussed, bid-rigging, and pricing policy, OT N20945,
69 NDT 81, OT N20933-37, 69 NDT 74-76; (d) telephone conversation re Consumers
Power job, OT N20980, 69 NDT 101; (e) October 12-14, 1958, meeting at Hot
Springs, OT N21152, 69 NDT 205; and (f) re December 1958 meetings at the Bilt-
more and Statler Hotels, OT N20984-85, 21007, 69 NDT 104, 119.
218 These instances relate to the following matters and occur at the following
pages: (a) meeting on June 20, 1957, re TVA Widows Creek No. 7 job, OT
N20896-97, N20901-02, 69 NDT 54-55, 57; (b) meeting in June 1957 at the Barclay
Hotel re persons present and jobs discussed, OT N20905, N20909-11, N20913-14, 69
NDT 59, 61-63; (c) meeting in September 1957 at the Barclay Hotel re Widows
Creek No. 7, OT N20920-21, 69 NDT 67-68; (d) meeting at Penn-Sherwood Hotel,
May 4, 1958, re general conspiracy policy, persons present, jobs discussed, and bid-
rigging, OT N20948-49, N20952, N20954-55, N20960-62, N20964-65, N21112, 69 NDT
83, 85-87, 90, 92, 182; (e) meetings re Consumers Power job, OT N20975-76, N20978,
69 NDT 99-100; (f) meeting at the Biltmore Hotel, December 7, 1958, and the
"working level" meeting thereafter, OT N20988, N20999, N21001-02, N21157-59,
N21167-69, 69 NDT 106, 114-16, 208-09, 213-15; (g) meeting on December 29-30,
1958, re Consolidated Edison and New England Power jobs concerning who was
present and the low bid price ("going-in price") agreed on, OT N21019-23, N21025-30,
60 NDT 126-33; (h) meeting in January 1959 at the Barclay Hotel re amount to be
added to bid price on Los Angeles Haynes Nos. 1 & 2 jobs, OT N21038-41, 69 NDT
137-39; and (i) discussions of specific jobs, including price and bid-rigging agree-
ments, OT N21137, 69 NDT 196 (East Kentucky REA escalation clause), OT
N21146-49, 69 NDT 201-03 (Cleveland Electric Illuminating Lake Shore No. 18
job), OT N21187, 69 NDT 226 (City of Tallahassee bid position), OT N21195-96,
69 NDT 231 (Dallas Power & Light North Lake No. 2 job), OT N21216, 69 NDT
242 (Union Electric Co. Merrimac No. 4 job), OT N21227-29, 69 NDT 249 (Con-
solidated Edison Astoria No. 4 job), OT N21251-52, 69 NDT 262 (Gulf Power
Crist No. 5 pricing). This resulted in having roughly 52 out of at least 110 pages
of grand jury transcript read into a public record.
A similar pattern, revealing like need, is found in Burke's reexamination. See
OT N22592, 68 NDT 99 passim (Oct. 14, 1963). Burke attempted to explain his
discrepancies in a bizzare fashion, but eventually admitted that the grand jury tran-
script indicated that he had stated that "a compromise was reached" at the Traymore
meeting, i.e., that prices were fixed at that meeting. See OT N22630, 68 NDT 122.
219 Compare Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1154, 1193-95 (1963).
220 See Order re Further Examination of Brenan R. Sellers, It re Sellers, Civil
No. 61-1277 and related cases, N.D. Ill., June 3, 1963.
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deponent after he had inspected the minutes and released them on a
finding of particularized need.2 21 Release should not be allowed when the
minutes do not reveal sufficient material to warrant a reexamination since
grand jury secrecy would be breached solely to aid the movant's trial
preparation.2 22  Although the deposition judge cannot be certain that the
party requesting the minutes will seek a reexamination if he releases the
minutes, he must be willing to hold that the minutes are sufficiently
informative to warrant a further examination if requested.
B. Permissible Uses for Released Minutes
Both the characterization of the minutes as past recollection recorded
and the rulings admitting them to the record are questionable. Some of
the events described to the grand jury had occurred more than three
years before the witness testified.2 This lack of contemporaneity would
not be a bar to using the minutes to refresh the witness' recollection if the
conspiracy continues until the time of the grand jury testimony and if the
minutes are "reasonably calculated to revive the witness' present recollec-
tion." 22 If the witness' memory is refreshed, he testifies as to what he
presently remembers, and the reliability of the document is not in issue.225
However, if his recollection is not refreshed, then the minutes themselves
would constitute the only evidence of the facts therein revealed. To insure
the reliability of documents used as past recollection recorded, the courts
have required that the facts be transcribed shortly after the event,22 6 and
the witness must state that the record accurately represents his knowledge
and recollection at the time of recordation.2 27 Thus, the three year delay
should preclude the use of the minutes for this purpose. The fact that
the narrative of the events was taken in a judicial proceeding should not
221 See text accompanying notes 125-31 supra.
22 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 29 F.R.D. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1961), aff'd,
309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.R.D. 486
(D. Del. 1954).
223 See OT N20879-81, 69 NDT 43-45 (Sept. 23, 1963).
224 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 236-37 (1940). In
this case the events occurred more than a year before the grand jury appearance.
The Court dismissed Putnam v. United States, 162 U.S. 687, 695-97 (1896), which
held grand jury testimony given four months after the event occurred inadmissible
to refresh as not contemporaneous, on the ground that "it does not establish an
inflexible four-months' period of limitation." Id. at 236. Moreover, the Putnam
Court failed to distinguish between present recollection revived and past recollection
recorded. See United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 888 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 941 (1949).
225 See United States v. Riccardi, supra note 224; 3 WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 758
(3d ed. 1940).
226 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 236 (1940);
cf. Putnam v. United States, 162 U.S. 687, 695-97 (1896). See also WIGmORE, op.
cit. supra note 225, §§ 745-46.
227 See Insurance Cos. v. Weides, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 375 (1871); WIGMORE,
op. cit. supra note 225, § 747.
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change this result because there was no opportunity for the party oppos-
ing admission to cross-examine the witness.
228
Since the trial judge will decide whether the grand jury minutes are
admissible at trial, the different functions which the minutes can serve
are crucial to the issue of whether they should be read into the record.
If the minutes are used to refresh a witness' recollection, he can be
shown his prior testimony without it being read into the record.2 29  Al-
though the deposition transcript may show that a witness whose recollec-
tion was refreshed is repeating facts which he disclosed to the grand
jury, the impact on secrecy is much greater when the actual testimony is
read into the record. The witness may be less likely to give his candid
characterization of certain events to the grand jury if he knows that they
will be exposed to the public. If the deponent has no present recollection
of the events, then the minutes should not be made a matter of public
record because the trial judge may rule that they are inadmissible as
substantive evidence at trial.230 Moreover, although rule 26(b) allows
the scope of a deposition to extend to testimony "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," 2 3 1 the grand jury minutes
should not be made public because the policies supporting grand jury
secrecy outweigh a mere possibility of gaining admissible evidence.
In another examination in which the deponent repeatedly stated that
his grand jury minutes did not refresh his recollection, Judge Boldt
granted thirty motions to read portions of the grand jury minutes into the
record.2 3 2  Although the deponent attempted to explain and correct his
grand jury testimony concerning facts which he had earlier stated he did
228 It is virtually universally accepted that prior testimony is not admissible if
there was no opportunity to cross-examine, see, e.g., Roucher v. Traders & Gen. Ins.
Co., 235 F.?d 423 (5th Cir. 1956), although testimony may be admissible if the
interested party or one with a like interest had an opportunity to cross-examine, see
Charles H. Demarest, Inc. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 380, 386-89 (Cust. Ct.
1959).
2 This alternative is preferable to having the minutes read to the witness who
is then asked if the minutes refresh his recollection, since the only additional breach
of secrecy consists of showing the witness his own testimony, whereas reading the
minutes to the witness makes them a part of the public record. Where the witness is
only shown a portion of his grand jury minutes, the page numbers of the portions
used can be entered in the record as an aid to the trial judge.
230 In Cox v. United States, 284 F.2d 704, 708 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 863 (1961), the court stated that grand jury testimony introduced at trial "does
not constitute affirmative evidence of the facts so stated." See also United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940). Although no court has ever
admitted grand jury minutes substantively under the past recollection recorded excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, this procedure would seem proper under certain circumstances.
It probably is not crucial that the writing was not made by the witness. See generally
McCoRmicx, EVlDEwcE § 279 (1954). However, since the testimony may have been
elicited by questions from a hostile party, the courts should not permit the introduction
of answers to leading questions or questions which did not give the witness an oppor-
tunity to explain.
231 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
282 This was the reexamination of John T. Peters, taken in New York on Sep-
tember 25, 26, 30, and October 1, 2, 9, 1963. The instances on which the deponent
was shown his grand jury minutes are found at OT N21287, 71 NDT 19 passim.
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not rememberZ 3 Judge Boldt expressly said that he was not ruling that
the minutes constituted impeaching material or past recollection re-
corded.2 34 Instead, he stated that he was reading them into the record
so that the trial judge "will be free to use his judgment as to whether the
references should be permitted . . . in the trial at all . . .". 235
Although there was great pressure on Judge Boldt to compile an ade-
quate record to avoid the trial delay incident to holding a second in camera
inspection or to finding the pertinent facts in the minutes their use to
compile a public record is unwarranted. Moreover, there seems to be no
reason for a public breach of grand jury secrecy at the deposition stage
since the parties may not choose to use the deposition at trial. Even if
the deposition judge rules that the minutes are admissable as impeaching
material or past recollection recorded, this determination is not binding
upon the trial judge.
There are two alternatives which would accomplish the goal of segre-
gating the relevant portions of the minutes for the trial judge without a
public release. The first would be to permit the deposition judge to read
the relevant portions into the record and require that the transcript be
impounded and made available only to the trial judge and counsel who
have already seen the minutes under the prior release order. The second
and preferable method would prohibit any reading of the minutes into the
record, but the transcript would show what pages of the grand jury minutes
were pertinent at each stage of the deposition. Either of these procedures
would allow use of the minutes at the deposition and would allow the
deponent to explain any corrections that he wished to make in his grand
jury testimony without a public breach of secrecy. Thereafter, on a motion
to read the minutes into the record at trial, the trial judge could easily
determine whether the minutes were admissible as past recollection re-
corded or to impeach, and could have only the admissible portions read
into the public record. In this way the grand jury minutes would not be
publicly displayed until they were actually used at a trial.
VI. A PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR RELEASE IN MULTIPLE LITIGATION
During the first two rounds of the national deposition program, twenty-
four motions for the release of grand jury minutes and nine additional
motions for the production of grand jury summaries were made. The
number of these motions along with the lack of a standardized method
for handling multiple litigation, the welter of transmission orders, and
the problems concerning the use of minutes after release, indicate that
the courts must have some organized procedure for dealing with multiple
protracted litigation.
93 See, e.g., OT N21300, 71 NDT 27 (deponent stated that his memory was
better on reexamination in 1963 than it had been before the grand jury in 1960).
=
4 See OT N21298, 71 NDT 26 (Sept. 25, 1963).
5 OT N21297, 71 NDT 25. Compare OT N21983, 72 NDT 9 (Oct. 7, 1963)
(reexamination of D. W. R. Morgan, Jr.).
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The electrical cases suggest an effective method for ordering this dis-
covery process by providing for a unified control of discovery through
NPTO 1 26 and for a national deposition and discovery program modeled
after NPTO 9237 and NPTO 16,21 the use of a judge to preside over
the depositions, and use of the assignment machinery to supply the needed
judicial manpower.
Once a national program is established, the depositions should pro-
vide for an initial examination followed by a recess during which a party
desiring the grand jury minutes can move for their production. If no
motion is made within a given time, the deposition can be adjourned.
Further examination would then be barred except on a showing of good
cause.
If such a motion is made, the deposition judge can then request the
minutes from the court having jurisdiction over the grand jury, and the
parties can argue the initial transfer motion before this latter court which
would make the initial determination as to whether it will delegate the
finding of particularized need to the deposition judge. Once this has been
done, the court can enter a transmission order similar to Judge Clary's
order in the electrical cases and no further motions before the controlling
district would be necessary. After the minutes are transmitted to the
deposition judge, an in camera examination may be granted at his discre-
tion; however, if the movant can show discrepancies between the deposi-
tion transcript and other sources of information, such as other depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and criminal indictments, an in camera exami-
nation should be granted. The deposition judge should then compare the
deposition transcript with the minutes and order release if the deponent
has failed to recall or has concealed facts vital to the plaintiff's case which
would require a reexamination if requested. However, only those por-
tions of the minutes relevant to the areas of inconsistency should be
released.
An adequate appellate procedure is imperative when release is granted.
Perhaps the best remedy for the inadequacies of the present methods of
appeal is to retain the certification procedure of section 1292(b), but
to amend that section to allow appeals from orders "where necessary for
the prompt or efficient administration of justice."'2 9 A release order
could then be certified for immediate appeal to review the impact of
release on the institutional reasons for protection of grand jury secrecy.
This procedure also provides an effective barrier against needless appeals
26 See Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVI. PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS 24-26 (1955), suggesting that rule 16 be amended to provide that the chief
judge of a district have the power to assign a protracted case to one judge for control
of discovery; Handbook 377 (1960).
27 See notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text.
238 See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
239 This language is taken from the initial proposal of § 1292(b) which was
deleted before the section was presented to Congress. See note 169 supra.
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since the district court's certificate is a limiting factor and since appellate
courts have been loath to require such a certificate by mandamus when it
has been denied below.240 It is also limited by the discretion of the court
of appeals to refuse to grant leave to appeal.
In summary the electrical cases are massive ones involving immense
problems of coordinating discovery and of dealing with motions for the
release of grand jury minutes as a part of this discovery. While the size
is staggering, these cases do not represent a unique situation. It is quite
likely that multiple litigation will also arise in other areas, including suits
against a common carrier as a result of an accident, such as an airplane
crash,2 41 or against a cigarette manufacturer for breach of warranty. The
electrical cases can serve as a guide for future multiple litigation.
Arthur F. Staubita
240 See Hirsch v. Bruchhausen, 284 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1960) (mandamus would
not lie to force the district judge to certify the case for appeal).
241 See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 84 Sup. Ct. 805 (1964).
